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INTRODUCTION
United States v. Mead Corp.' is the U.S. Supreme Court's most impor-
tant pronouncement to date about the scope of the Chevron doctrine.2 Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, Mead is "one of the most
significant opinions ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial re-
view of administrative action."' Justice Scalia also thought that the conse-
quences of "the Mead doctrine," as he called it, "will be enormous, and al-
most uniformly bad."4
Justice Scalia's indictment of Mead was driven by his attachment to
rules and dislike of standards.' He saw Mead as shifting the practice of
* John Paul Stevens, Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
2. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Mead, 533 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 239, 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cmi. L.
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deference away from the more rule-like Chevron approach toward the more
standard-like doctrine associated with Skidmore v. Swift & Co.6 As he
noted sarcastically, 'The Court has largely replaced Chevron ... with that
test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared
by litigants who want to know what to expect): th'ol' 'totality of the cir-
cumstances' test., 7 Justice Scalia urged instead that Chevron be declared
the sole measure of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes,
with Skidmore relegated to the dustbin of history as an "anachronism."
The majority responded with an air of patient resignation. "Justice
Scalia's first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify," Justice
Souter observed in his opinion for the Court, whereas others would "tailor
deference to variety."9 Justice Souter could afford to take a detached atti-
tude toward Justice Scalia's fulminations. In his campaign to award the
field to Chevron as the sole survivor in a battle against Skidmore, Justice
Scalia failed to attract a single additional vote.' °
But the choice between rules and standards was present in Mead not
only at what might be called the primary decisional level-the level where
courts decide whether to accept any particular agency's interpretation of a
statute. The choice is also implicated at the meta-level where the court
must decide which legal doctrine to use (Chevron or Skidmore) in deter-
mining whether to accept the agency interpretation. Assuming-as eight
Justices evidently do-that we have two deference doctrines, the more rule-
like Chevron and the more standard-like Skidmore, how do we determine
where Chevron stops and Skidmore starts within the system of judicial re-
view? Do we police this boundary by means of a meta-rule or a meta-
standard?
As to this higher-order issue, there was no meaningful debate between
Justice Souter and Justice Scalia. Justice Souter began his opinion by an-
nouncing what appeared to be a two-part rule: "We hold that administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
REv. 1175 (1989) (commenting on the benefits of a jurisprudence based on rules rather than
standards).
6. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
7. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Id at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 236.
10. In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), eight Justices subscribed to
the view that Skidmore survives as a distinct deference doctrine, with only Justice Scalia
dissenting on this point. See id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to apply Skidmore
deference to a Department of Labor opinion letter); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 641-42 (1998) (applying both Chevron and Skidmore deference to different interpreta-
tions); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991) (applying Skidmore
deference over Justice Scalia's concurrence, which urged the use of Chevron).
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deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency inter-
pretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority."" By the time Justice Souter had finished his analysis, however,
the inquiry had collapsed into a formless consideration of "factors" of un-
specified weight. That is to say, the majority ended up with a meta-
standard. Justice Scalia, for his part, also started with what appeared to be
meta-rule: Chevron should apply to any interpretation "by the administer-
ing agency that is authoritative-that represents the official position of the
agency." 2 But on closer examination this too turned out to be a multi-
factoral standard, albeit one that Justice Scalia insisted was more "bright-
line" than the standard employed by the majority."
I argue in this Article that both the majority, and the dissent, were mis-
taken in seeking to define the domain of Chevron with anything other than
a meta-rule. The majority was on the right track in holding that the key to
the scope of Chevron is whether Congress has delegated authority to an
agency to make rules with the force of law, and the agency has exercised
that authority. The next logical step was to define what it means for an
agency to act with "the force of law." The traditional understanding is that
agency action has such an effect when it is not open to further challenge
and subjects a person who disobeys to some sanction, disability, or other
adverse legal consequence. Final legislative rules, both substantive and
procedural, have this effect, as do final, self-executing adjudicatory orders.
Other types of agency action do not. A reasonably clear meta-rule was thus
within the grasp of the Court. It should have seized it. As we shall see,
using a meta-rule to determine the scope of Chevron deference has a num-
ber of desirable consequences that will be diluted or lost under a meta-
standard.
I. IN SEARCH OF THE MEAD DOCTRINE
Chevron, of course, is the Court's most important decision about the
most important issue in modem administrative law-the allocation of
power between courts and agencies "to say what the law is.' 4 Chevron de-
scribes a now-familiar two step procedure for resolving this issue, asking
11. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. See id. at 237 (stating Skidmore, rather than Chevron,
applies when "circumstances indicate no intent to delegate general authority to make rules
with force of law, or where such authority was not invoked [by the agency].").
12. Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 258-59 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLum. L. REv.
2071, 2074-75 (1990) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) and de-
scribing Chevron as a "counter-Marbury" for the administrative state).
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first whether Congress has "directly spoken" to the contested issue of inter-
pretation, and if not, whether the agency's interpretation is "permissible" or
"reasonable."15 The inquiry seems rule-like because each step is defined in
terms of the examination of a single variable-whether or not Congress has
answered the question (step one), and whether or not the agency interpreta-
tion is reasonable (step two).1 6
As any administrative lawyer can attest, this rule-like appearance is de-
ceptive. Many different considerations can be brought to bear in deter-
mining at step one whether a statute is clear or ambiguous; an equally
wide-range of variables are implicated in asking at step two whether the
agency has adopted an interpretation that is reasonable. Still, as compared
to the multi-factoral approach that preceded Chevron, and that lives on un-
der the mantle of Skidmore, the Chevron doctrine narrows significantly the
range of factors that courts may consult in deciding whether to accept or
reject an agency reading of a statute. In that sense, the Chevron doctrine is,
if not a rule, at least more rule-like 7 than Skidmore,
which setf. forth a sliding scale of deference owed an agency's interpretation of a
statute that is dependent "upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] considera-
tion, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to con-
trolu
' ' s
For many years after Chevron, it was unclear whether Chevron had su-
perseded Skidmore, or if not, when courts should apply Chevron and when
they should turn to Skidmore.'9 The Court took its first important step to-
ward resolving these issues just two years ago in Christensen v. Harris
County.20 The question was whether an agency interpretation advanced in
an opinion letter written by an agency official, and later endorsed in an
amicus curiae brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, is eligible for Chev-
ron deference. Five Justices, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held Chev-
15. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
16. "A rule singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them conclusive of legal li-
ability; a standard permits consideration of all or at least most facts that are relevant to the
standard's rationale." Mindgames, Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000)
(Posner, C.J.).
17. As others have recognized, rules and standards are not a dichotomy but exist along
a continuum. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Stan-
dards, 106 HAnv. L. REv. 22, 57 (1992) (noting rules and standards fall along a "continuum
of discretion").
18. Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
19. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO L.J. 833, 848-52 (2001) (cataloguing numerous unresolved questions about when
Chevron applies).
20. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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ron does not apply in these circumstances.2  The majority stated that
agency interpretations are eligible for Chevron deference only if they have
been advanced in a decisional format that has the "force of law," and an
opinion letter, whether or not endorsed in an agency amicus brief, does not
have the force of law.2 The Court made no attempt to explicate what it
means for agency action to have the force of law, or how the force of law
criterion links up with the underlying rationale of Chevron.
Christensen elicited two dissents with respect to the scope of Chevron.
Justice Scalia argued that the agency opinion letter was entitled to Chevron
deference, because it reflected the "authoritative" view of the agency. 3
Justice Breyer, joined in relevant part by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
opined that the majority had overstated the distinction between Chevron
and Skidmore, and suggested that Chevron simply identified "an additional,
separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency determinations. 24
Sensing further clarification was needed, the Court immediately granted
the government's petition for certiorari in United States v. Mead Corp.,25
which presented the question whether tariff classification rulings issued by
the Customs Service are entitled to Chevron deference. When a ruling fi-
nally emerged in Mead, it revealed a new alignment. Eight Justices, in-
cluding the five who had joined the Thomas opinion in Christensen,26 plus
the three who joined the Breyer dissent,27 united behind an opinion by Jus-
tice Souter holding that tariff classification rulings are not entitled to Chev-
ron deference.2 ' This time, only Justice Scalia dissented, again asserting
his view that any "authoritative" interpretation should be eligible for Chev-
ron deference.29
Tariff classification rulings are letter rulings issued by the Customs
Service in response to a request by an importer for advice as to what tariff
applies to a proposed importation of foreign goods. Such rulings are ex-
pressly authorized by statute, which speaks of them as "binding" rulings,30
and the implementing regulations state that they are "binding on all Cus-
21. See id. at 577 (noting Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
were in the majority).
22. Id. at 587.
23. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25. 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000).
26. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (naming the five Justices in the Christen-
sen majority opinion).
27. See supra text accompanying note 24.
28. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
29. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1994).
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toms Service personnel" until "modified or revoked."'" However, this
binding effect is limited to the specific import transaction described, and
other importers are cautioned not to rely upon the rulings "in connection
with any transaction other than the one described in the letter., 32 In the
typical case, no public notice or opportunity to comment is provided before
tariff classification rulings are rendered, nor is the importer entitled to a
hearing beyond the request for a ruling and the responsive letter, which
may or may not include a statement of reasons. Tariff classification rulings
are extremely numerous; forty-six different Customs Service offices issue
over ten thousand classifications every year.33
Mead is designed to serve as a major statement about the nature and
scope of the Chevron doctrine, and in many respects the opinion succeeds
in providing valuable clarification. At the most general level, Mead elimi-
nates any doubt that Chevron deference is grounded in congressional intent.
Throughout the opinion, the Court refers to congressional intent, expecta-
tions, contemplations, thoughts, and objectives.34 The opinion makes clear
the ultimate question in every case is whether Congress intended the
agency, as opposed to the courts, to exercise primary interpretational
authority. This should put to end the speculation that Chevron rests on
something other than congressional intent, such as the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers or a judge-made canon of interpretation.3
Mead also emphatically reaffirms that the choice is not between Chevron
or no deference. If Chevron does not apply, courts nevertheless may be re-
quired to defer to agency interpretations under Skidmore, which applies
when the agency has some special claim to expertise under the statute, but
its interpretation is not legally binding. Thus, after Mead we have three
degrees of deference to agency interpretations of statutes: Chevron-a rule-
like doctrine that requires courts to accept reasonable agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutes; Skidmore-a standard that requires courts to
consider agency interpretations under multiple factors and defer to the in-
terpretation if it is persuasive; and no deference-a rule that applies when
independent judicial review is required, for example, where the agency ac-
tion is alleged to violate the Constitution, or where statutes designed to
31. U.S. Customs Service Administrative Rulings, 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a) (2001).
32. Id. § 177.9(c).
33. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
34. See id. at 229 (explaining congressional expectations); id. at 230 n. 11 (discussing
congressional intent); id. at 231 (mentioning congressional thoughts); id. at 234 (noting
congressional objectives); id. at 236 (describing congressional intent); id. at 238 (providing
further discussion of congressional intent).
35. For a discussion of different jurisprudential arguments justifying Chevron defer-
ence, endorsing congressional intent as the most plausible, see Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 19, at 863-73.
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constrain agency discretion like the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
are at issue.
Finally, Mead reaffirms and elaborates on Christensen's basic proposi-
tion that Chevron applies only when the agency interpretation has the
"force of law." The Court held that a two part inquiry should be under-
taken in determining whether Chevron-style deference is in order.36 The
court should ask, first, whether Congress has delegated to an agency gen-
eral authority to make rules with the "force of law." 7 If the answer is in
the affirmative, the court should then ask whether the agency has rendered
its interpretation in the "exercise of that authority." 38 Thus, the key ques-
tion that must be resolved at the threshold in determining whether Chevron
applies is one of legislative intent-whether Congress intended to delegate
power to the agency to take action having the force of law.
These clarifications are of considerable importance. Still, the decision
leaves major uncertainties. Most notably, Justice Souter did not identify
any triggering condition for determining when an agency has been given
the power to act with the force of law. Instead, his opinion proceeds by
discussing a number of factors suggesting that the Customs Service had not
been delegated power to act with the force of law in issuing tariff classifi-
cation rulings.39 He declined to identify any of these factors as being either
necessary or sufficient conditions for finding the relevant type of delega-
tion. In other words, the Souter opinion implicitly treats "force of law" as
an undefined standard that invites consideration of a number of variables of
indefinite weight.4°
To make matters worse, the Souter opinion is unclear even as to exactly
how many factors it regarded as being relevant. Depending on how one
reads the opinion, the Court considered either three, four, or five factors.
36. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27, 237.
37. Id. at 227.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 231-34.
40. In a footnote near the end of the opinion, the majority appeared to go even further,
suggesting that Chevron's domain can only be determined through case-by-case, analogical
reasoning:
It is, of course, true that the limit of Chevron deference is not marked by a hard-edged
rule. But Chevron itself is a good example showing when Chevron deference is war-
ranted, while this is a good case showing when it is not. Judges in other, perhaps
harder, cases will make reasoned choices between the two examples, the way courts
have always done.
Id. at 237 n. 18. This suggests the Court envisioned the choice between Chevron and Skid-
more being determined through a process of pure casuistic rcasoning. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 1012-16 (1995) (explaining and defending
casuistic reasoning).
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My reading is that the discussion boils down to three factors: (1) whether
Congress has prescribed relatively formal procedures; (2) whether Con-
gress has authorized the agency to adopt rules or precedents that generalize
to more than a single case; and (3) whether Congress has authorized the
agency to prescribe legal norms that apply uniformly throughout its juris-
diction. Nevertheless, I readily admit that the number and correct charac-
terization of the factors invoked in the majority opinion is open to debate.4'
One factor clearly deemed relevant by the majority is whether the statute
"provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure ... .,42 The
majority opinion says "a very good indicator" of the requisite intent is "ex-
press congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking
or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed."43 This point will undoubtedly be the source of much confusion.
I do not think the Court was saying, as some commentators and lower
courts suggested before Mead,4 that if an agency adopts notice-and-
comment or trial-type hearing procedures on its own authority, its inter-
pretation is presumptively entitled to Chevron deference. Rather, the Court
seemed to be saying when Congress commands the use of notice-and-
comment or trial-type procedures, and the agency exercises this authority,
then the resulting interpretation presumptively reflects a delegation of
authority by Congress to act with the force of law.
This proposition seems correct as an empirical generalization. Congress
will tend to command the use of relatively formal procedures only when
the action has important consequences, and agency action that binds with
the force of law has such consequences. Thus, commands to use formal
procedures will tend to be positively correlated with actions having the
41. The case for four factors would be that, in addition to whether Congress has
authorized rules or precedents that generalize beyond a particular case, the Court also con-
sidered whether the agency had sought to exercise such authority. See Mead, 533 U.S. 230-
33 (breaking into two paragraphs the discussion of the nature of the congressional delega-
tion and the Customs Service practice). I discount this because the point of the Court's con-
sideration of agency practice in the second paragraph seems to be to confirm its construction
of congressional intent. The case for five factors would be that, in addition to the preceding
four, the Court also considered whether Congress has provided for de novo review of the
agency action that incorporates the interpretation. See id. at 233-34 & n.16 (noting the
Court of International Trade (CIT) engages in independent review of tariff classification
rulings). I discount this because it appears to be inconsistent with United States v. Haggar
Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999), which held that substantive regulations of the Cus-
toms Service are entitled to Chevron deference notwithstanding de novo review of Customs
decisions Service by the CIT.
42. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
43. 1d. at 229.
44. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore with the Ar-
chitecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1105 (2001).
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force of law. As Justice Scalia correctly observed, however, "[tihere is no
necessary connection between the formality of procedure and the power of
the entity administering the procedure to resolve authoritatively questions
of law."'45 For example, the APA authorizes agencies to make legislative
rules in several contexts without observing notice-and-comment proce-
dures.46 Thus, the relationship between procedural formality and the force
of law is at most empirical, not analytic.
The majority appeared to acknowledge this point, although it did so in a
manner that was itself empirical rather than analytical. The majority noted
that although
the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed
the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication[ ,... the want of
that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons
for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and
none was afforded....47
This, of course, does not explain why an instruction to use formal proce-
dures should--or should not-be regarded as relevant to whether there has
been the right kind of delegation. The Court appeared to be invoking a
kind of stare decisis-essentially saying the lack of procedural formality
cannot be decisive because in past cases the Court did not treat it as deci-
sive.48 For whatever reason, the Court acknowledged that whether Con-
gress has prescribed formal procedures is neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition of finding the relevant delegation; it is at most a factor positively
correlated with the likelihood that such a delegation has occurred.
After the convoluted discussion of formal procedures, there ensue two
45. Mead, 533 U.S at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia notes, as an example,
that rules "involving grant and benefit programs... are exempt from the requirements of
informal rulemaking." Id. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2000). The APA also exempts rules involving "military
or foreign affairs function[s]," and section 553 authorizes agencies to issue binding legisla-
tive rules without notice-and-comment procedures where the agency finds "good cause" to
forego these procedures or when the agency adopts rules of "agency organization, proce-
dure, or practice." Id. § 553(a)(1), (b)(3)(A)-(B).
47. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31. Actually, the Court cited only one such case, Nations-
Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57, 263 (1995), to
support its assertion. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. Justice Scalia cited four others, all de-
cided within six years of Chevron. See id. at 252-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. This was a feeble argument, since the question whether Chevron applies notwith-
standing the absence of any directive to use formal procedures had merely passed in silence
in the handful of cases referenced by the Court. Thus, these were not holdings about the
scope of the Chevron doctrine that would require overruling if they could not be accommo-
dated to the "force of law" test.
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paragraphs even more obscure in their import.,' My interpretation of these
paragraphs is they boil down to a single second factor: whether Congress
has authorized agency action that has a legal effect that generalizes to more
than the agency and the party who requests it. In other words, a delegation
to act with legal force will ordinarily authorize rules that bind all persons
who come within their terms or, at the very least, orders that invoke deci-
sional rules which are then treated as precedents in future controversies.
If this was what the Court was saying, then it is undoubtedly correct.
Any interpretation eligible for judicial deference must invoke some rule of
decision-some legal principle or rationale. An administrative scheme that
disclaims any binding effect beyond the party to the ruling--even if it is
only precedential effect-is one that generates no "law" in the relevant
49. Lest I be accused of exaggerating, here they are:
No matter which angle we choose for viewing the Customs ruling letter in this
case, it fails to qualify under Chevron. On the face of the statute, to begin with, the
terms of the congressional delegation give no indication that Congress meant to dele-
gate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of law. We are
not, of course, here making any global statement about Customs's authority, for it is
true that the general rulemaking power conferred on Customs authorizes some regu-
lations with the force of law, or "legal norms" as we put it in [United States v. Hag-
gar Apparel Co.). It is true as well that Congress had classification rulings in mind
when it explicitly authorized, in a parenthetical, the issuance of "regulations estab-
lishing procedures for the issuance of binding rulings prior to the entry of the mer-
chandise concerned." The reference to binding classifications does not, however, be-
speak the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to
the ruling, once the goods classified are admitted into this country. And though the
statute's direction to disseminate "information" necessary to "secure" uniformity
seems to assume that a ruling may be precedent in later transactions, precedential
value alone does not add up to Chevron entitlement; interpretive rules may sometimes
function as precedents, and they enjoy no Chevron status as a class. In any event, any
precedential claim of a classification ruling is counterbalanced by the provision for
independent review of Customs classifications by the CIT; the scheme for CIT review
includes a provision that treats classification rulings on par with the Secretary's rul-
ings on "valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted merchandise, entry requirements,
drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters." It is hard to imagine a congressional
understanding more at odds with the Chevron regime.
It is difficult, in fact, to see in the agency practice itself any indication that
Customs ever set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it undertook to make
classifications like these. Customs does not generally engage in notice-and-comment
practice when issuing them, and their treatment by the agency makes it clear that a
letter's binding character as a ruling stops short of third parties; Customs has re-
garded a classification as conclusive only as between itself and the importer to whom
it was issued, and even then only until Customs has given advance notice of intended
change. Other importers are in fact warned against assuming any right of detrimental
reliance.
Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-33 (citations omitted).
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sense and hence cannot have the "force of law."50
It is unclear whether the majority understood this factor, like the first, to
be empirical and predictive of the required type of delegation, or whether it
was suggesting some analytical connection between authority to make gen-
eralized decisional rules and the power to act with "the force of law." At
one point the majority states "precedential value alone does not add up to
Chevron entitlement; interpretive rules may sometimes function as prece-
dents, and they enjoy no Chevron status as a class. '"Sl This would seem to
negate any claim that authority to articulate a rule of decision is a sufficient
condition of power to act with the force of law. The majority did not say
whether this factor is a necessary condition.
A third factor stressed by the Court is also somewhat cryptic, but easier
to unpack. The Court observed that the Customs Service generates thou-
sands of tariff classifications each year from different ports of entry, with
no systematic effort at coordination. The Court thought it was "simply
self-refuting" to suggest that Congress intended such a system to have the
force of law.52 The thought here seems to be that a delegation to an agency
to act with the force of law will usually generate uniform rules throughout
the agency's jurisdiction. A regulatory system unconcerned with whether
like cases are treated alike is an unlikely candidate for the appellation
"law."
This too seems correct as an empirical generalization. Implicit in the
ideal of the rule of law is the understanding that the same legal rules will be
applied to similar transactions wherever the legal regimes applies. When
Congress establishes a regime that is not designed to maintain legal uni-
formity, it is implausible to describe the rulings generated by that regime as
having the force of law. Once more, however, the Court did not suggest
the uniformity is either a necessary or sufficient condition of finding the
relevant type of delegation. This factor, like the first (and probably the
second), is implicitly treated as predictive rather than analytical.
Justice Scalia, for his part, would apply Chevron to any agency inter-
pretation that is "authoritative."' 3  By "authoritative," however, Justice
Scalia did not hone in on any single variable, as would typically be the case
50. For a discussion of the role of rules in systems of precedent, see Larry Alexander,
Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989) and Frederick Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. RaV. 571 (1987).
51. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232 (citations omitted). The Court here cited to Peter Strauss,
The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE L.J. 1463, 1472-73 (1992), which makes the point
that interpretive rules are often treated by agency personnel as having approximately the
same force as agency precedent.
52. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
53. Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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with a rule. To the contrary, he mentioned a variety of variables that might
be relevant in determining whether a particular interpretation reflects the
"official position of the agency.,1 4 These include: (1) whether the inter-
pretation has been endorsed at the "highest levels" in the agency as op-
posed to by "some underlings;" (2) whether the general counsel has de-
fended the interpretation in court; (3) whether the interpretation has been
supported by a brief filed by the Solicitor General; and (4) whether the in-
terpretation is more than a "'post hoc rationalizatio[n]"' or a legal position
developed by the agency in litigation."5 Thus, "authoritative" is also a type
of standard rather than a rule. Justice Scalia acknowledged at one point
that "[t]he authoritativeness of the agency ruling may not be a bright-line
standard ... ,,s6 But, he quickly added, "it is infinitely brighter than the
line the Court asks us to draw today.,
57
The majority and Justice Scalia were engaged in a version of the peren-
nial debate over rules versus standards. But, they were largely talking past
one another. Justice Scalia's sarcasm about "th' ol' totality of the circum-
stances test" was directed at employing Skidmore at the primary decisional
level in cases where the more rule-like Chevron does not apply.8 He de-
voted relatively little energy to chastising the majority for adopting a meta-
standard for fixing the boundary between Chevron and Skidmore.59 The
majority opinion, in contrast, was not interested in defending standards or
attacking rules at the primary level. Rather, the majority was content to
54. Id.
55. Id. at 258-59 & n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 259 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Most of Justice Scalia's arguments
about the bad consequences of "the Mead doctrine" were directed to the majority's counte-
nance of continued use of Skidmore. Thus, he argued that Skidmore was "a recipe for un-
certainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation;" that the majority's approach would lead
to an "artificial] ... increase" in rulemaking by agencies in an effort to escape the uncer-
tainties of Skidmore and gain Chevron deference; and that Skidmore deference would lead to
"ossification" of statutory law, since agency interpretations upheld under Skidmore, unlike
those sustained under Chevron, cannot be reversed by agencies at some later date. Id. at
246, 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Indeed Justice Scalia appeared at times to understand the majority as advocating
something akin to a meta-rule for these purposes-that Chevron applies when agencies
utilize relatively formal procedures, but not otherwise. See id. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia described the majority's "background rule" as follows:
[W]hile there is no single touchstone for [an intent to delegate authority to act with
the force of law] it can generally be found when Congress has authorized the agency
to act through (what the Court says is) relatively formal procedures such as informal
rulemaking and formal (and informal?) adjudication, and when the agency in fact
employs such procedures.
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have both a rule and a standard at this level, and was preoccupied with
identifying the factors that are relevant at the meta-level in determining the
line of division between the two. As to this meta-question, it is unclear that
either side fully appreciated the rules versus standards debate has replicat-
ing itself once again. In any event, at this level, both the majority and the
dissent ultimately opted for a standard rather than a rule.
I. THE CASE FOR A META-RULE
The voluminous literature on rules and standards suggests a number of
justifications for rules.6 At least four are relevant to the choice between
meta-rules and meta-standards for determining the proper scope of the
Chevron doctrine.61 First, rules are better than standards in confining the
discretion of actors at lower levels within a hierarchy, and hence are useful
in overcoming principal-agent problems within complex organizations.
62
Second, rules are better than standards in providing a basis for security of
expectation about the future behavior of the government, and thus they en-
courage investment and planning. 3 Third, rules are better than standards in
communicating information; hence, they facilitate coordination among dif-
ferent government actors.64 Finally, rules are often more efficient than
60. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987) (ar-
guing "rules dependn in part on the supposition that standards are not feasible .....");
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 135-67 (1991) (noting fairness, reliance, effi-
ciency, stability, and co-ordination as reasons for rules); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (discussing the
costs and benefits of rules versus standards); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (exploring circumstances in which rules and
standards are likely to be preferable); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal
Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23 (2000) (discussing implication of
behavioral psychology for choice between rules and standards); Scalia, supra note 5, at
1179 (noting predictability as a justification for rules); Sullivan, supra note 17, at 62-69
(noting fairness as formal equality, utility, liberty, and democracy as arguments favoring
rules).
61. These are by no means the only or even the most important justifications for rules.
They are, however, the ones that I think are most relevant in considering whether a meta-
rule is appropriate for delimiting the scope of the Chevron doctrine.
62. See Korobkin, supra note 60, at 37-38; Scalia, supra note 5, at 1179 (noting when
an appellate judge adopts a general rule, the rule constrains lower courts as well as appellate
judges).
63. See SCHAUER, supra note 60, at 137-45 (focusing on rules and predictability as fa-
cilitating reliance on decision makers); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law,
40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 590-92 (1988) ("[Courts should let the advantages and disadvan-
tages fall where they may... [to] encourage people to plan and to act carefully ... ").
64. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
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standards, because they conserve the need to expend resources on legal ad-
vice and litigation.65
Each of these justifications links up with a different audience affected by
whether the Court selects a meta-rule or meta-standard for fixing the scope
of Chevron: the first applies primarily to the lower courts, the second to
agencies, the third to Congress, and the fourth to nongovernmental entities.
I consider each in turn.66
A. Lower Courts: Confining Discretion
The lower federal courts are obviously a primary audience for any meta-
test devised by the U.S. Supreme Court for fixing the boundary between
Chevron and Skidmore. Rules are generally more predictable and easier to
enforce than standards. Hence, they generally are a superior mechanism
for controlling the behavior of subordinate actors within a hierarchy. The
issue here is how important it is that the Court be able to control the be-
havior of the lower courts. In the federal judicial system, the problem of
control is greatly exacerbated by the extremely limited number of cases the
U.S. Supreme Court can review in any given year.67 If the Court had the
capacity to review every court of appeals decision, then it could indulge in
the luxury of engaging in case-by-case reasoning in defining the scope of
the Chevron doctrine. But, when the Court has the ability to review only a
small percentage of cases, effective control of the lower courts' behavior
may require that the Court adopt a meta-rule.
The issue of control of lower courts is especially important where part of
Property: the Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE U. 1 (2000) (commenting on the
communicative function of rules in the context of standardized units of ownership in prop-
erty law).
65. See SCHAUmR, supra note 60, at 145-49 ('[W]hen a decision-maker decides ac-
cording to rules and therefore relies on decisions made by others, she is partially freed from
the responsibility of scrutinizing every substantively relevant feature of the event.").
66. 1 will not consider one possible objection to this inquiry: that the legal rubric for
deference has little effect on judicial behavior, so there is no point in quibbling about it.
Whether Chevron's two step approach results in more acceptance of agency interpretations
than Skidmore's multi-factoral standard is, of course, an empirical question. Although more
and better studies are needed in order to resolve this question, there is reason to believe that,
at least at the margins, use of the Chevron formula will produce greater deference by courts
to agency interpretations of law than would an open-ended standard like Skidmore. This is
particularly likely to be true in the lower courts. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light
on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 15
YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998) (reviewing studies of the impact of Chevron).
67. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 1093,1118-29 (1987).
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the objective is to assure that lower courts follow a rule-like approach, i.e.,
Chevron, over a significant range of controversies. Although Christensen
and Mead cut back on the scope of the Chevron doctrine, there is no sign
that the Court is less committed to Chevron where it properly applies. If
anything, the Court's commitment appears to be growing as it comes to see
Chevron deference as the only plausible strategy for preserving uniformity
and coherence within complex federal statutory regimes.68 Yet, if we adopt
a meta-standard to govern the choice between rules and standards at the
primary decisional level, there is obviously a danger that lower courts will
employ this meta-standard to favor the use of the discretion-maximizing
primary standard (Skidmore).69
I do not wish to overstate the danger of lower court discretion here. If
lower courts look beyond the Court's nebulous meta-standard, and heed the
holdings of its recent decisions, their discretion clearly will be constrained
to a significant degree. After Mead, no lower court will apply Chevron
rather than Skidmore to an agency interpretation adopted in an opinion let-
ter. And no lower court is likely to apply Skidmore rather than Chevron to
an agency interpretation adopted pursuant to an express grant of legislative
rulemaking authority. The area of uncertainty has been narrowed to things
like interpretative regulations adopted after notice-and-comment proce-
dures, and informal adjudications that are treated like precedents by the
agency. Moreover, the problem of lower court discretion in these interme-
diate areas is likely to be only temporary. As the Court gradually decides
cases in these intermediate areas, it should eventually transform the meta-
standard into something more like a complex meta-rule, thereby reducing
lower court discretion.
Still, if it is generally desirable that lower courts give Chevron deference
to agency interpretations, such a goal will be undermined to a degree if
lower courts are given broad discretion under a meta-standard to decide
whether Chevron applies over a range of situations not yet addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court. The risk that lower courts will undermine the sys-
temic benefits of greater deference to agency interpretations; thus, provides
some basis for preferring a meta-rule over a meta-standard.
68. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 19, at 861-62.
69. An analogy is the contrast in choice of law between Joseph Beale's vested rights
doctrine (a meta-rule) and Brainerd Currie's interests analysis (a meta-standard). See Erin
Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of
Law, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1551, 1558-60 & nn.33, 34 & 44 (2000). One consequence of
adopting a meta-standard for choice of law purposes is that it effectively gives trial courts
discretion to determine which substantive law to apply.
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B. Agencies: Encouraging Investment
Agencies are also affected by the choice between meta-rule and meta-
standard. Here, the relevant justification for using rules rather than stan-
dards is they make the behavior of those who wield the coercive power of
the state more predictable, and in doing so, facilitate planning and encour-
age investment. This justification applies to agencies in the following way.
Agencies regard Chevron deference as a good thing. Agencies very much
want judges-government actors who review their decisions and have the
authority to set them aside-to accept their legal interpretations, so they
can more effectively implement the statutes they have been charged with
administering. Yet, it is now clear, agencies must make a certain invest-
ment in administrative processes to obtain the Chevron payoff. In the vo-
cabulary of Christensen and Mead, agencies must take whatever procedural
steps are necessary to assure that their interpretation has the "force of law."
It is a matter of considerable importance to agencies that they know in ad-
vance that if they make this investment they will get the Chevron payoff.
Otherwise, they may end up foregoing opportunities to obtain Chevron def-
erence because they erroneously assume it is unavoidable, or they may end
up expending resources on procedures unnecessarily because they errone-
ously assume Chevron is avoidable.
To make the problem more concrete, consider two examples. Agencies
often face the choice between making policy by legislative or interpretative
rule. Legislative rules entail certain costs that interpretative rules do not:
Legislative rules usually require the agency to engage in cumbersome no-
tice-and-comment procedures, and once adopted, a legislative rule cannot
be retroactively amended. If both legislative and interpretative rules were
entitled to Chevron deference, many agencies would prefer to use interpre-
tative rules to make policy. But, if only legislative rules get Chevron def-
erence, then there is a tradeoff. The agency will have to decide whether
obtaining the higher degree of judicial deference is worth the additional
procedural costs associated with legislative rules.
One can tell a similar story about the choice between formal adjudica-
tion and opinion letters. Formal adjudication requires a greater investment
in procedures than opinion letters do, and formal adjudication typically cre-
ates a precedent that can be cited in future cases, whereas opinion letters
often do not. So, if agencies can get Chevron deference for opinion letters,
70. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216-25 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting absent express statutory authority to the contrary, the APA prohibits
legislative rules with retroactive effect); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979)
("Certainly regulations subject to the APA cannot be afforded the 'force and effect law' if
not promulgated pursuant to the statutory procedural minimum found in that Act.").
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many agencies would prefer to go this route. If only formal adjudication
gets Chevron deference, however, it is a more difficult call because the
price of such deference is higher.
Adopting a meta-rule to determine the scope of the Chevron doctrine
would reduce uncertainty about what sorts of agency interpretations are
eligible for Chevron deference. Agencies would thus find it easier to pre-
dict what sort of payoff they will receive for using different types of proce-
dural formats to advance interpretations of law. Greater predictability
about payoffs should reduce the incidence of over-or under-investment in
administrative procedures, and should reduce the number of episodes in
which agency initiatives are frustrated by what happens on judicial review.
All of this seems desirable, and provides a second reason to prefer a meta-
rule to a meta-standard for defining the ambit of Chevron.
C. Congress: Communicating Information About Legal Options
A third audience affected by the Court's choice between a meta-rule and
a meta-standard is Congress. Here, we encounter yet another advantage of
rules relative to standards-because they are relatively predictable, rules
send clearer signals than standards about what legal options exist. Better
communication about legal options not only enhances individual reliance
interests, it also facilitates coordination among governmental institutions.7
This is relevant to Congress because Christensen and Mead make it clear
that Congress has the authority to turn Chevron deference on and off.
Congress can either delegate power to an agency to act with the force of
law with respect to a particular issue (Chevron on), or it can choose not to
delegate such power to the agency (Chevron off). But, Congress can exer-
cise this authority only if it knows what it must say in a statute in order to
convey the message that an agency has been given power to act with the
force of law.72 If acting with the force of law is defined by a meta-rule,
then Congress will have a relatively clear signal about what it must do to
confer primary interpretative authority on an agency. Conversely, if acting
71. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreward: Law as Equilibrium,
108 HARV. L. REv. 26, 66 (1994).
72. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) ("What is of paramount im-
portance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretative
rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."). For recognition of this
point in the context of Chevron, see Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to m-
prove the Legislative Process: Can it be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL.
105 (1997); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Recon-
ciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 5 (2000); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of
Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511,516-17.
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with the force of law is defined by a blurry meta-standard, whether Con-
gress has succeeded in designating an agency (or the courts) as the primary
interpreter often cannot be established until after the issue has been liti-
gated. Adopting a meta-rule, therefore, serves to preserve and protect the
role of Congress, which the Court has identified as the very foundation of
the Chevron doctrine.
In this regard, it is important to note that Christensen and Mead repre-
sent a significant step toward revitalizing the principle of legislative su-
premacy, or if you will, the nondelegation doctrine. By grounding Chevron
in congressional intent to delegate power to make rules with the force of
law, the Court has resuscitated the axiom that Congress is the primary
source of authority to make law within our system of separation of powers.
With narrow exceptions, neither the executive nor the courts have inherent
power to act with the force of law. 73 They derive such power only pursuant
to a valid delegation from Congress.74 If this principle is worth reaffirm-
ing, then presumably it is important that Congress, and all other actors
within the system of separation of powers, understand what it takes for
Congress to delegate the power to make rules with the force of law.75
A possible objection to these arguments is that, at least as to the future,
Congress should have no trouble directing whether agencies have authority
to make interpretations that have the force of law. Congress simply has to
include a statement in the statute that agency rules or orders will or will not
have the force of law. (For that matter, Congress could simply specify
whether reviewing courts should or should not apply "the Chevron doc-
trine').
This is true as to new legislation, but it overlooks the problem of what
happens under existing legislation. Congress does not have the time or in-
stitutional capacity to review and amend all existing delegations to agen-
cies to add the appropriate tag line to assure the desired allocation of inter-
pretational authority is reached. If the Court adopts a clear meta-rule about
what kinds of delegations will sustain Chevron deference, however, then
73. See JAMES HART, THE ORDINANcE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 110-19 (1925) (discussing the lack of inherent executive power to make
law); Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PAcE L. REv. 327, 339 (1992) (dis-
cussing the lack of inherent judicial power to make law).
74. For a clear statement of this principle, which has never been overruled, see ICC v.
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co., 167 U.S. 479, 494-95 (1897) (hold-
ing Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) cannot be given substantive rulemaking
authority by implication, but only by express grant).
75. The linkage between Mead and the nondelegation doctrine has already been per-
ceived by the D.C. Circuit. See Michigan v. EPA, 254 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (relying
upon Mead in striking down Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule as being unsup-
ported by any delegation of authority to make rules with the force of law).
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Congress (and affected agencies and interest groups) usually can ascertain
by examining existing statutes what conclusion courts will reach. In this
way, the relevant parties will be in a position to know which statutes can be
left alone, and which should be targeted for revision.
D. Nongovernmental Entites: Efficiency
Finally, nongovernmental entities subject to the regulatory oversight
have an interest in whether the scope of the Chevron doctrine is defined by
a meta-rule or a meta-standard. Because rules are more predictable than
standards, lawyers generally can provide better advice about the probable
outcome under a rule than they can about the probable outcome under a
standard.76 Similarly, when issues are drawn into litigation, arguments
about the proper application of a rule will generally require less effort to
develop than arguments about the proper application of a standard. Where
meta-issues are concerned, these disparities in the relative efficiency of
rules and standards are multiplied.
Consider a regulated entity that seeks advice from a law firm about
whether an agency interpretation of law is likely to be sustained on judicial
review. If it is unclear whether the reviewing court will apply Chevron or
Skidmore, and the choice between the two is governed by a meta-standard,
the advice will have to cover three issues: (a) the probable outcome under
Chevron, (b) the probable outcome under Skidmore, and (c) whether it is
more likely that the interpretation will be reviewed under Chevron or Skid-
more. In contrast, if the dividing line between Chevron and Skidmore is
marked by a rule, the legal advice very likely will have to address only
point (a) or point (b). In effect, the use of a meta-rule reduces the issues
that must be considered to one-third what would be required under a meta-
standard.
Similarly, consider a regulated entity that seeks to challenge an admin-
istrative interpretation on judicial review. If it is unclear whether the court
will apply Chevron or Skidmore, then each of the three issues mentioned
above--(a), (b), and (c)-must be briefed by the parties. If the choice is
governed by a rule, chances are the briefs will have to cover only (a) or (b).
Thus, determining when Chevron applies by use of a meta-rule would al-
most certainly result in efficiency gains, specifically in terms of conserving
on the resources expended by nongovernmental entities on legal advice and
litigation.
76. See SCHAUER, supra note 60, at 145-49 (discussing the "efficiency" of rules); cf.
Korobkin, supra note 60, at 34-35 (arguing that advice costs and costs of predicting what
behaviors are permitted are generally higher under standards than rules).
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In sum, there is a substantial case, at least in the abstract, for determining
the scope of the Chevron doctrine by means of a meta-rule rather than a
meta-standard. The rule-based approach promises to constrain the discre-
tion of the lower courts, encourages agencies to make the correct invest-
ments in administrative procedures when formulating policy, provides a
clear signal that Congress can use to allocate interpretational power be-
tween agencies and courts, and conserves on expenditures on legal advice
and litigation by regulated entities. This conclusion is consistent with the
meta-tests found in other areas of administrative law, where questions
about applicable procedures or standards of review are often resolved by
using relatively bright-line, single-variable rules. Examples include the
question whether formal or informal procedures apply in rulemaking, and
whether adjudications are subject to the substantial evidence standard of
review, both of which are resolved by asking whether Congress has speci-
fied that the agency action is to be "on the record.,
77
The main vice of rules, as emphasized in the literature on rules and stan-
dards, is that they are almost always either over- or under-inclusive with
respect to the underlying goals of the legal system. 78 In other words, rules
will always generate sub-optimal results relative to an ideal system that
would costlessly apply a standard that reflects those goals. But, of course,
standards are not costless. As emphasized here, standards generate princi-
pal-agent problems, uncertainty costs, communications difficulties, and in-
creased expenses devoted to legal services. The question then becomes
whether there is any meta-rule that will delineate Chevron's domain in a
way that achieves the cost savings associated with rules, but without gener-
ating excessive problems of over- or under-inclusion.
III. WHEN AGENCIES ACT WITH THE FORCE OF LAW
In determining whether there is a satisfactory meta-rule for determining
the scope of the Chevron doctrine, I take it as a given that the basic inquiry
is whether Congress has delegated power to an agency to make rules with
the force of law, as Christensen and Mead so hold. Kristin Hickman and I
have spelled out more fully elsewhere why this foundational proposition is
consistent with the underlying rationale of the Chevron doctrine.79 We can,
77. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973) (formal rule-
making procedures required only when statute requires hearing "'on the record"); Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973) (substantial evidence review applies only when reviewing
findings made on a hearing record).
78. See KELMAN, supra note 60, at 40-41; SCHAUER, supra note 60, at 31-34; Koro-
bkin, supra note 60, at 36-37; Sullivan, supra note 17, at 58.
79. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 19, at 863-82.
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therefore, narrow our search by asking whether it is possible to articulate a
satisfactory rule for identifying when Congress has delegated power to act
with the force of law.
A. The Key Variable: Legislated Consequences for Violations ofAgency
Action
Traditional administrative law readily suggests a candidate for such a
rule-an agency acts with the force of law when it adopts a rule or order
that, once final, is no longer open to challenge and subjects a person who
violates the rule or order to the imposition of some sanction, disability, or
other adverse consequence. Administrative-law types will recognize that
this is a restatement of the familiar "legal effects" test for identifying leg-
islative or substantive rules. As stated in the leading decision of the D.C.
Circuit:
A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the
force of law. In subsequent administrative proceedings involving a substantive rule,
the issues are whether the adjudicated facts conform to the rule and whether the rule
should be waived or applied in that particular instance. The underlyino policy em-
bodied in the rule is not generally subject to challenge before the agency.
A parallel understanding exists with respect to adjudications. Agency
orders adopted in adjudications are understood to have the force of law
when, once they are final, the order is regarded as res judicata and is no
longer open to challenge on the merits.8 ' In a subsequent action to enforce
such an order, the only issues are whether the order was violated and if so,
what sanction for violation is appropriate.
These traditional understandings can be adopted as the basis for a meta-
rule defining what it means for an agency to act with the force of law-
with one important qualification. The inquiry that is typically undertaken to-
day in asking whether an agency rule or order has the force of law focuses
on whether the agency intended its action to give rise to sanctions, disabili-
ties, or other adverse legal consequences once it becomes final! 2 In effect,
courts have assumed agencies have the power to act with the force of law,
and have asked whether the agency, in its discretion, has exercised this
80. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
81. See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 278 (1987) (decision of ICC
not to reopen prior order not subject to judicial review once time for appeal of underlying
order has passed); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 111 (1977) (no judicial review of deci-
sion declining to reopen benefits determination after time for appeal of initial decision
lapsed).
82. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[Ihf by its action the agency intends to create new law .... the rule is properly considered
to be a legislative rule.").
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power.83 In the context of determining the scope of the Chevron doctrine,
the threshold inquiry, following Mead, must be whether Congress has
delegated power to the agency to act with the force of law. In other words,
before asking whether the agency intended to act with the force of law, we
must first determine whether, under the agency's organic legislation, Con-
gress has given the agency power to make rules or orders that have the
force of law. The critical inquiry for these purposes is whether Congress
has provided by statute that persons who violate an agency's rules or or-
ders will be subject to the imposition of sanctions, disabilities, or other ad-
verse consequences. In other words, the key variable under the proposed
meta-rule is whether Congress has included a provision in the statute that
prescribes sanctions or other legal consequences for violations of agency
action.
To illustrate, consider the contrast between the rulemaking grants in the
Securities Act of 1933 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of
1935. The Securities Act provides in section 19(a) that "[t]he Commission
shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
subchapter.. . ."" This is clearly a grant of authority to make rules having
the force of law, because section 24 of the Act specifically provides that
"[a]ny person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this subchap-
ter, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under
authority thereof,... shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both., 5 Section 6(a) of the
NLRA provides, in terms very similar to section 19(a) of the Securities
Act, that "[t]he Board shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by subchapter I of chapter 5
of title 5, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter. 8 6 This is not a grant of authority to make
rules having the force of law because the NLRA contains no provision im-
posing any sanction, disability, or other adverse legal consequence on per-
sons who violate such regulations.8 7
83. But see Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548,
558 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("A rule can be legislative only if Congress has delegated legislative
power to the agency and if the agency intended to use that power in promulgating the rule at
issue.").
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000).
85. Id. § 77x (emphasis added).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1994).
87. The phrase "in the manner prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5," i.e.,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), was added by amendment by the Taft-Hartley Act
in 1947. If, as I maintain, the Labor Board was not given any authority to promulgate rules
with the force of law, this amendment is puzzling, since the APA generally prescribes pro-
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Focusing on the presence or absence of congressionally-prescribed legal
consequences is more than just a convenient formalism. It also makes
sense as a guide to congressional intent, provided one adopts two fairly
plausible assumptions. One assumption is that most members of Congress
understand that agencies act with the force of law when they adopt rules or
orders backed by sanctions, broadly understood to mean civil or criminal
penalties, disabilities or other legal consequences. That is to say, most
members of Congress, at least when drafting regulatory statutes, embrace
an Austinian or positivist conception of "law" as rules backed by the coer-
cive power of the state.88 The other assumption is that most members of
Congress believe agencies can act with the force of law only if Congress
gives them this power, either expressly or by clear implication. In other
words, members of Congress embrace the version of the nondelegation
doctrine that denies agencies have any inherent power to make law. Put
these assumptions together, and it follows that most members of Congress
understand agencies have been given authority to make rules or orders with
the force of law only if Congress has prescribed some sanction or other le-
gal consequence for the violation of the agency's rules or orders.
Historically speaking, there is also surprising support for the proposition
that the presence of legislated sanctions for violations of agency rules has
been regarded by Congress as the key variable in determining whether stat-
utes authorize agencies to act with the force of law. The legislative histo-
ries of a number of important regulatory statutes of the Progressive and
New Deal eras indicate Congress regarded the inclusion of sanctions for
violations of agency rules as the critical point of differentiation between
grants of substantive and mere interpretative power.8 9 Commentaries by
attorneys who were actively involved in advising Congress on this issue,
cedures only for legislative rules. The Mead approach, which puts great weight on whether
Congress has directed the use of notice-and-comment procedures for rulemaking, requires
that we try to decipher the significance of this amendment in determining whether Congress
has delegated authority to the Labor Board to make rules with the force of law. My ap-
proach, which would look only to whether Congress has attached consequences to the vio-
lation of rules, renders the mysterious amendment irrelevant.
88. J.L. Austin defined law to mean general commands backed by the threat of sanc-
tions. See generally JoN AUSTIN, TIE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfred
Rumble ed., 1995). Austin's command theory was a central tenet of Landellian legal for-
malism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM
IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 83-104 (1998). Although the Legal Realists attacked the Lan-
gellian conception, they did so largely because they objected to what they regarded as the
deductive nature of formalism, not because they disagreed with the command theory. See
id.
89. The evidence is detailed in Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn A. Tongue, Agency
Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention (Oct. 22, 2001) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author, forthcoming 116 HARv. L. REv.).
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and materials assembled by the Attorney General's Committee on Admin-
istrative Procedure, also confirm this understanding.9" Whether Congress
continues to adhere to this understanding is harder to say, since modem
courts have not focused on the presence of legislated sanctions in deter-
mining whether agencies have substantive rulemaking power.9' But, at
least during the formative years of the administrative state this was the
congressional practice, and that practice forms part of the backdrop of un-
derstanding reflected in the APA.
B. Over- and Under-inclusion
Like all rules, the proposed meta-rule keyed to whether Congress has
prescribed sanctions or other legal consequences for violations of agency
action is both over- and under-inclusive, in the sense that it would identify
power to act with the force of law in certain circumstances where it may be
objectionable, and would deny such power in certain circumstances where
it may be desirable. The question, as always, is whether the costs of over-
and under-inclusion are sufficiently great to cause us to abandon the use of
rules (or at least, of this rule), in favor of a standard.
The principal problem of over-inclusion is that the proposed meta-rule
includes within its sweep certain kinds of agency action as to which the
public has no notice or opportunity to comment before an interpretation is
adopted. Before turning to these instances, it is important to stress that, on
the whole, the proposed meta-rule does a pretty good job of limiting Chev-
ron deference to situations in which some kind of public notice and input is
in fact available. The rule excludes from the realm of Chevron deference
all interpretative rules and policy statements-the most important exemp-
tions from notice-and-comment requirements under section 553 of the
APA.92 Neither interpretative rules nor policy statements give rise to sanc-
tions or other adverse legal consequences immediately upon violation; the
agency must bring some independent action to achieve this result, in which
the norm reflected in the interpretative rule or policy statement will be open
90. See Frederick P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1
(1940) (article by former House and Senate legal counsel); see also FINAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrTTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 27 (1941).
91. See Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has general substantive rulemaking authority not-
withstanding absence of any provision imposing sanctions or other legal effects for viola-
tions of rules promulgated under general rulemaking authority); Nat'l Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
has substantive rulemaking power even though original grant of rulemaking power con-
tained no mention of sanctions or other legal consequences of violating rules).
92. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000).
[54:2
THE MEAD DOCTRINE
to challenge. 93 In addition, the proposed rule eliminates from the scope of
Chevron opinion letters, agency manuals, press releases, amicus briefs, and
so forth-all of which lack any legislative sanction for violation and also
lack any requirement of public input before promulgation.
Still, there are a few instances of agency action that have the force of
law under the proposed meta-rule but are exempt from any public notice-
and-comment requirement. These include legislative rules for which good
cause exists to omit these requirements, certain types of rules associated
with benefit and grant programs, and procedural rules. 94 For one who be-
lieves (as I do) that Chevron deference should generally be confined to cir-
cumstances in which there has been some opportunity for public input be-
fore an interpretation is adopted, these exceptions are troubling. On the
other hand, it should be noted by way of mitigation that legislative rules
adopted under the good cause exception are usually only interim rules.
Procedural rules will generally be of lesser consequence than legislative
rules. And modem benefit and grant statutes often are implemented by no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking even if not required by the APA.95
There are two problems of under-inclusion. One is that the legislative-
sanctions test which would deprive certain agencies of Chevron deference
for interpretations contained in rules, because, under this definition, they
would have no authority to promulgate legislative rules. Included most
prominently here are the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (as to rules promulgated under its
general rulemaking authority). Both agencies have grants of rulemaking
authority that include no provision for sanctions or other adverse conse-
quences for rule violations.96 This is a genuine problem, however, only if
one is prepared to reject as irrelevant the intentions of the Congresses that
adopted the organic legislation establishing these agencies. It is quite clear
that the Congresses that enacted the NLRA in 193597 and the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 193898 did not intend to give either agency gen-
93. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAvis & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 228-48 (3d ed. 1994).
94. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 244 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. On the interim status of rules adopted under the good cause exception and the lim-
ited consequences of procedural rule exception, see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 19, at
905-07. For an example of benefit and grant rules made subject to APA procedures, see
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting general policy of the La-
bor Department to waive any invocation of APA exemption for benefit and grant rules).
96. For details, see Merrill & Tongue, supra note 89.
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
98. 21 U.S.C, §§ 301-395 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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eral legislative rulemaking authority.99 If this state of affairs is deemed to
be inconsistent with contemporary views of appropriate agency authority,
then Congress can amend the statutes to give these agencies legislative
rulemaking authority, as it did in the case of the similarly-situated Federal
Trade Commission, which also lacked legislative rulemaking authority un-
til it was conferred by Congress in 1975.'00
The other problem is that certain agencies that engage in relatively for-
mal adjudication would be denied Chevron deference for interpretations
rendered in adjudications, because their orders are not self-executing. The
NLRB, for example, issues cease and desist orders that do not result in any
imposition of sanctions for violations, unless and until a court enters an or-
der enforcing the Board's order."" Thus, it is the court's order, not the
Board's, that gives rise to the imposition of sanctions for violations. Since
the proposed meta-rule focuses on whether Congress has prescribed some
sanction for violation of the agency's rule or order, this means NLRB or-
ders would not be entitled to Chevron deference. This result seems some-
what counterintuitive, since NLRB orders are issued after a relatively for-
mal adjudicatory process, and the Court has often stressed that the NLRB's
interpretations adopted in adjudication are entitled to deference (although it
has not expressly held that they are entitled to Chevron deference).'0 2 On
the other hand, the fact that Congress declined to give NLRB orders the
force of law unless they have been reviewed and sustained by a court tells
us something about whether Congress intended to give the Board primary
interpretational authority.
Whether these instances of over- and under-inclusion are sufficiently
troubling to warrant the use of a standard rather than a rule, or to warrant
abandonment of the proposed meta-rule in favor of some other (possibly
more complex) rule, is necessarily a judgment call. My own view is that
the advantages of a clear and simple rule are sufficiently great, and the
known instances of over- and under-inclusion are sufficiently few, that the
proposed rule warrants our allegiance. In other words, I see no reason why
the Court could not have offered a single-variable triggering definition for
what it means for an agency to act with the force of law, consistent with
99. See Merrill & Tongue, supra note 89.
100. See Federal Trade Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183
(amending the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 to confer legislative rulemaking
authority on the FTC). The D.C. Circuit held in 1974 that the FTC has legislative rulemak-
ing authority, but this was contrary to the original understanding of the FTC Act of 1914
and to longstanding practice. See Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
101. See 2 PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEvLaoPrNG LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE
COURTS, ANDo THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1877-78 (3d ed. 1992).
102. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 19, at 838 n.23.
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traditional administrative law precepts: Agencies have been given power to
act with the force of law when Congress has prescribed some sanction or
other legal consequence for violations of agency action. In so doing, it
could have avoided the "utter flabbiness"'' 3 of its list-of-factors approach.
CONCLUSION
On the whole, "the Mead doctrine" is a sound development. Mead clari-
fies that Chevron rests on congressional intent, and correctly concludes
from this that Chevron applies only when Congress has given some signal
that the agency, rather than the court, is to be the primary interpreter of
statutory ambiguity. The decision also correctly concludes that the relevant
signal of Congress's intent in this regard is a delegation of power to act
with the force of law. By linking Chevron and congressional intent, Mead
helps achieve a reconciliation between Chevron and the judicial review
provisions of the APA.1' 4 Indeed, by insisting that the agency gets strong
deference only when it acts within the scope of delegated power to act with
the force of law, and not otherwise, Mead goes part way toward restoring
an important aspect of the nondelegation doctrine, which otherwise fared
poorly last Term. °'0
To be sure, the decision comes up short in terms of articulating a meta-
rule to guide lower court in future controversies. Mead says Chevron ap-
plies only when Congress has delegated authority to an agency to act with
the force of law, but it treats "force of law" as (at most) a standard to be
applied by looking to a variety of factors. The Court's decision to treat
"force of law" as a standard rather than a rule is regrettable. But nothing
the Court did or said precludes future decisions that brush away the fuzzi-
ness in the majority's exposition, leaving us with a clear and defensible
103. Mead, 533 U.S. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. The APA provides that reviewing courts are to "decide all relevant questions of
law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). This directive arguably can be reconciled with Chevron def-
erence to agency interpretations, however, if Congress, by delegating power to an agency to
take action with the force of law, is understood implicitly to direct courts to accept reason-
able agency interpretations. Justice Scalia argues in his Mead dissent that this "implied re-
peal" theory is inconsistent with section 559 of the APA, which says that a subsequent stat-
ute may be held to supersede the APA only if it does so "expressly." Mead, 533 U.S. at 241
n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 5 U.S.C. § 559. But surely identifying a duty to defer to the
agency based on the express presence of legislated consequences for rule violations comes
closer to superseding the APA "expressly" than does Justice Scalia's theory, which rests the
duty to defer on a generalized "legal presumption of congressional intent" untethered to any
specific legislative directive. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting once again a
claim that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated power to an agency by failing ade-
quately to limit agency discretion).
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meta-rule.
Finally, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's fulminations, Mead secures a
bright future for the Chevron doctrine. It is now clear that Chevron defer-
ence is significantly more powerful than ordinary deference. It is also clear
that Chevron applies whenever agencies exercise delegated lawmaking
authority from Congress. With these propositions established, judges are
more likely to take Chevron seriously. This includes the Justices of the
Supreme Court. In the past, a number of Justices have ignored Chevron or
applied a watered down version of Chevron.'0 6 In Mead, eight Justices
trimmed back on the scope of Chevron, but gave it a sounder jurispruden-
tial foundation and signaled that it enjoys the full support of the Court in its
new, slimmed-down form. In the long run this compact, but powerful,
Chevron doctrine should enhance, rather than retard, the transfer of inter-
pretational power from courts to agencies.
106, See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969,980-93 (1992).
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